英语翻译如题

英语翻译如题
英语翻译
如题

英语翻译如题
案例一：
TSAKIROGLOU & CO. LTD. V NOBLEE THORL G. m. b. H.House of Lords
[1962] A. C. 93
事实：
THE FACTS:
By a contract dated Hamburg, October 4, 1956 between Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd, of Khartoum as sellers, and the respondents, Noblee Thorl G. m. b. H. of Hamburg/Hargurg as buyers, through agents, the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers to buy about 300 tons of Sudanese groundnuts in the shell basis 3 percent, admixture new crop 1956/1957 at $50 per 1,000 kilos including bags c.i.f. Hamburg. Shipment November/December, 1956, with payment cash against documents on first presentation for 95 percent of the amount of provisional invoice, balance to be paid after the analysis on final invoice. The contract form was to be the incorporated Oil Seed Association Contract No.38(hereinafter called “I.O.S.A Contract No. 38”) with arbitration in London. Clause 1 of I.O.S.A Contract No. 38 provided for “shipment from an East African port…by steamers(tankers excluded) direct or indirect with or without transshipment.”
Both parties contracted on the basis that the goods would be shipped from Port Sudan. Clause 6 of the contract provided: “in case of prohibition of import or export, blockade or war, and in all cases of force majeure preventing the shipment within the time fixed, or the delivery, the period allowed by not exceeding two months. After that, if the case of force majeure be still operating, the contract shall be cancled.”
At the date when the contract was made, both partied contemplated that shipment would be made via the Suez Canal. On October 29, 1956, the Israelis invaded Egypt, on November 1 Britain and France commenced military operations, and on November 2 the Suez Canal was blocked to shipping. At the date when the contract entered into, the usual and normal routes for the shipment of Sudanese groundnuts from Port Sudan to Hamburg was via the Suez Canal. However, the closure of the Suez Canal prevented transport from Port Sudan to Hamburg via the Canal and the impossibility by that route continued until April 1957. The distance via the Suez Canal is approximately 4,386 miles and the distance via the Cape of Good Hope is approximately 11,137 miles. From November 10, 1956, after the closure of the Canal, a 25% freight surcharge was placed on goods shipped on vessels proceeding via the Cape of Good Hope and this was increased to 100% on December 13, 1956.
The seller’s claim that the contract was frustrated and was at an end because of the closure of the Suez Canal was not accepted by the buyers.
法院程序：
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT
In arbitration proceedings, the umpire, by an award dated February 20, 1957, awarded that the sellers were in default and should pay to the buyers as the damages the sum of $5,625 together with $79 15s. costs of the award. The sellers were dissatisfied with the award, and a board of appeal appointed to hear the appeal on January 28, 1958, dismissed the appeal and upheld the umpire’s award.
判决：
JURISDICTION
The board of appeal’s award was in following term: “so far as it is a question of fact we find and as far as it is a question of law we hold:
(i) These were hostilities but not war in Egypt at the material time.
(ii) Neither war nor force majeur prevented the shipment of the contract goods in the contract period to the contract destination, since shipment via the cape was not so prevented when the shipment via the Suez Canal was prevented by reason of force majeur.
(iii) It was not an implied term of the contract that shipment or transportation should be made via the Suez Canal and shipping the goods on a vessel via the Cape of Good Hope was not commercially and fundamentally different from shipping the goods on a vessel via the Suez Canal. So, the contract was not frustrated by the closure of Suez Canal.”
分析问题：
MERITS: Is there an implied term that the goods shall be carried by a particular rout? Is the contract frustrated?
(a) usual and customary route
The contention that the shipment of goods must be via Suez can only prevail if a term is implied, for the contract dose not say so. For the general proposition that in a c.i.f. contract the obligation, in the absence of express terms, is to follow the usual or customary route. It is not the date of the contract but the time of performance that determines what is customary. As the section 32(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, provides that: “unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable having regarded to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case.” Therefore, if there is no customary route, that route must be chosen which is reasonable. If there is only one route, that must be taken if it is practicable. At the date when the performance was called for, there was no usual or customary route because the Suez Canal was closed and the only practicable route was via the Cape of Good Hope. The sellers could have fulfilled their obligation by a bill of lading via the Cape.
(b) whether the contract was frustrated by the closure of Suez?
The board should consider whether the imposition upon the sellers the obligation to ship by an emergence route via the Cape would be to impose upon them a fundamentally different obligation which neither party could at the time when the contract was performed have dreamed that the sellers would be required to perform. The board found no justification for the positive answer. A c.i.f. contract is for the sale of goods, not a contract of affreightment. The primary duty on the part of sellers was to dispatch the groundnuts by sea from one port to destination of the other. There was no evidence that the buyers attached any importance to the route. They were content that the nuts should be shipped at any date in November or December. There was no stipulated date for arrival at Hamburg. There was no evidence either, that the nuts would deteriorate or the transportation would involve special packing or stowing as a result of a longer voyage, nor any evidence that the market was seasonable. In a word, there was no evidence that the buyers cared by what route, or within seasonable limits, when the nuts arrived.
What, then, of the sellers? Clearly the contract of affreightment will be different and so may be the terms of insurance. In both these respects the sellers may be put to greater cost: their profit may be reduced or even disappear. But an increase of expense is not a ground of frustration, the doctrine of frustration must be applied within very narrow limits, and this case falls far short of satisfying the necessary conditions. With all these facts before them, the board of appeal made their finding that performance by shipping on the Cape route was not commercially or fundamentally different from shipping via the Suez Canal, and the appeal should be dismissed.
TSAKIROGLOU和股份有限公司.有限公司.V . NOBLEE THORL m . b.H.上议院
亚特兰大93][1962年
事实:
事实:
日期由一个合同,1956年10月4日汉堡,Tsakiroglou &公司之间.有限公司是作为卖方,和对喀土穆的受访者,Noblee Thorl g . m . b.h .汉堡/ Hargurg通过代理人进行的,因为买方,卖方同意出售,买方购买约300吨花生壳的基础上在苏丹3%,新作物1956/1957掺合料在50美元每1000公斤包括塑料袋的cif价格.汉堡.1956年11、12、装运,以付款交单方式付款先介绍为95%的数量的临时发票后再付款,平衡分析最终的发票.合同的形式也要被合并的石油合同出版社,种子协会(以下简称“三八”号合同,我们已将I.O.S.A)与仲裁在伦敦.合同第一条规定的I.O.S.A 38号规定的“装运港…从一个非洲东部由轮船(加油机除外)直接或间接的或有或无转船.”
双方的合同的基础上从港口装运的货物将苏丹.第6条合同提供的:"如果发生禁止进出口,封锁或战争,在任何情况下都不可抗力防止固定的时间内装船,或交货、时期所允许不超过两个月.在这之后,如果不可抗力的情况下还是操作,本合同应取消了.”
当合同之日起,两partied沉思,货物会经苏伊士运河.1956年10月29日,以色列入侵埃及,11月1日,英国和法国开始军事行动,并将于11月2日苏伊士运河航运堵住了.当合同之日起进入,常规的和正常的路线的装运港苏丹从苏丹落花生去汉堡是经过苏伊士运河.然而,关闭苏伊士运河运输从港口阻止苏丹运往汉堡,通过运河与不可能通过这条路线一直持续到四月1957年.通过苏伊士运河的距离大约是通过4,386英里的路程,距离好望角是大约11,137英里.从11月10日,1956年关闭后,运河里,有25%的货运附加费是放在通过血管进行货物的好望角和这是增加到100% 1956年12月13日.
卖方的要求正当,宣布该合同不灰心、到了末日,因为苏伊士运河的关闭由买方不被接受.
法院程序:
程序之前,法庭
在仲裁程序中,裁判裁决日期,2月20日,1957年,授予,卖方违约,应在买方支付美元的损害5,625的总和15s.连同79美元的成本奖.卖方不满的奖励,听到中的上诉委员会任命上诉1月28日,1958年,解散了上诉,维持裁判员的裁决.
判决:
管辖权
中的上诉委员会的裁决是在以下条件:“到目前为止,因为它是一个事实问题,我们发现,只要是一个问题的法律,我们持有:
(我)这些人都是在埃及敌对行动而不是战争在材料的时候.
(二)并且战争还是不可抗力阻止了一批合同货物与合同的合同期限装运目的地,因为通过好望角时也不那么预防经苏伊士运河装运的原因是预防不可抗力.
(3)这不是一项默示合同期内的那批货的装运或交通应经苏伊士运河和运输货物的船只通过好望角不是商业和根本不同的船只装运此货通过苏伊士运河.所以,合同都没有挫伤的关闭苏伊士运河.”
分析问题:
优点:有一项默示的术语,它的货物,应当由被某个特定的溃败吗?是合同烦躁吗?
(一)常规和习惯航线
争论货物的装船必须经苏伊士运河只能流行如果一个学期的合同是暗示的,不这么说.在为广大主张合同义务的到岸价格,在缺乏明示条款,是遵循通常和习惯的路线.它不是合同签订之日起,不过时间的表现,决定什么是惯例.作为部分32(2)的商品销售的行为,1893年,规定:“除非其他授权由买方、卖方必须做出这样的合同与载体代表买方合理有认为商品的性质和其他情况下的案子.”因此,如果没有习惯航线,这条路线的一定要选哪是合理的.如果只有一位路线,必须采取措施,如果它是可行的.在约会当表现是呼吁,没有普通或者习惯航线,因为苏伊士运河被关闭和唯一可行的路线是经过好望角.卖方可以履行他们的义务由提单通过的斗篷.
(b)是否该合同是沮丧的封苏伊士运河吗?
董事会应该考虑是否在卖方的税款的义务,由一个出现船通过好望角路线会强加在他们身上是一个从根本上完全不同的义务,任何一方可以在海上保险合同进行的想象中,卖方将被要求完成.董事会发现没有理由积极的回答.合同是到岸价格销售的商品,而不是一个运输合同中的.对部分的基本义务的销售商是派遣落花生海运从一港运至目的地.没有证据表明买方的任何重要附路线.他们是内容应该被清理的坚果在任何日期在11月或12月.没有规定的日期为到达汉堡.不是的,是没有证据的坚果会退化或交通将涉及到特殊包装或害羞,结果较长的旅程,也没有任何证据显示市场得到了及时.总之,没有证据表明买方关心哪条路线,或在被限制,当螺母及时到达.
那么,什么卖方索赔吗?运输合同中的清楚的将是不同的,因此可能是整个的保险待遇.在这两个方面的卖方可能把利润更大的成本:他们可能会减少甚至消失.但增加的费用支出不是地沮丧,沮丧的教义必须应用在非常狭窄的范围,而本案异常不够满足的必要条件.他们与所有这些事实之前,董事会的求援:他们发现,在开普敦性能由船公司没有商业路线或从根本上不同于船舶经苏伊士运河,上诉应该被开除.