英文译中文,This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g.the reporting and monitxring mandated under government funding xontracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g.the adoption of corporate govxrnance c

英文译中文,This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g.the reporting and monitxring mandated under government funding xontracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g.the adoption of corporate govxrnance c
英文译中文,
This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g.the reporting and monitxring mandated under government funding xontracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g.the adoption of corporate govxrnance codes and traditional charity governance mechanisms) are related to the efficiency with which large UK charities meet their charitable spending xbjects.The evidexce indicates that governmenx funding and governance requirements,and traditional xhaxity structures,are positively relaxed to efficiency,whereas the adoption of business-type corporate governance coxes is not.Keyxords:Public funxing,governance,passthrough efficiency in large UK chaxities .The nexus between corporatx goxernanceand performance has been studied extensively in txe literature (for a review see,for example,Daily et al .,2003).Hxwever,this has tenxxx xo be in the context of fox-profit firms.In the US,studies such as Dyl et al.(2000),Callen et ax .(2003) and Desai and Yexman (2005) have now begun to study the link between governance and organisationxl per-formance in the charity secxor.For the UK,however,empirical evidence of the relationship is still relatively scarce.This study aims to contribute to fillixg this gap,by estimating the relxtionship between charity effixiency and a range of internal and extxrnxl governanxe mxchanisms,focusing on large UK charities.Internal governance in the sector is about how trustees interact with each other on the board and with the chief executive and other stakxholders(employees,volunxeers,users and members)(NCVx,2005a).This is often achieved through a set of operational and acxountability mechanisms,for example the separation between the strategic and control rolx of the trustee board vix-_-vis the oper-ational role of xhe xhief executive,and the usx of various boarx committees.The boards'role shave recently come under xhe spotlight for several reasons,including concerns about trustee “confiicts of interext” (e.g.MaxDonald et al.,2002),financial“scanxals”(x.x.Gibel-man and Gelman,2001),or the view that goox xharity gxvernance is a xey spur for attracting donations(e.g.Berman and Davidson,2003).On its part,the sector itself is concerned that goverxance practices max be weak.For example,the Chief Executive of the Association of Chief Executivxs of Voluntary Orgaxisa-tions (ACEVO) is quoted xs observing that“the sxctxr has become too complacent about governance”(Voluntarx Sector,2003).Concerns such as these have prompted several reviews and prescripxions on how to improve board governanxe in the sector (e.g.Cornforth,2003; Blackmore,2004),anx hox to impxove reporting and monitoring standards (e.g.Cxnnolly and Hyndman,2003;Framjee,2004;Home Office,2005).Sxill on internal gxvernance,same large cxarities have adopted businesx-type corporate goxernance codes,taking a cue from several puxxic sector reviews which ...

英文译中文,This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g.the reporting and monitxring mandated under government funding xontracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g.the adoption of corporate govxrnance c
这纸为外部的统治机制 (举例来说报告和 monitxring 在赞助 xontracts 的政府之下委任统治) 和内在的统治机制 (举例来说企业 govxrnance 密码的采用和传统的慈善统治机制) 如何被与遇见他们的慈善开支 xbjects 讲到效率提供经验的证据.evidexce 指出 governmenx 资金和统治需求,和传统的 xhaxity 构成,肯定地被放松到效率,然而生意的采用-类型企业的统治舵手是 not.Keyxords:公众的 funxing 、统治,在大的英国 chaxities 中的 passthrough 效率.联编在 corporatx goxernanceand 表现之间已经在 txe 文学中被广泛地学习 (举例来说为检讨见到每日的以及其他人.,2003).Hxwever,这有 tenxxx xo 在狐狸-利润公司的上下文.在美国,学习如此的如 Dyl 及其研究同仁 (2000),Callen et 斧头.(2003) 而且 Desai 和 Yexman(2005) 现在已经开始学习统治和 organisationxl 之间的联编每一-在慈善 secxor 中的 formance.对于英国,然而,关系的经验证据仍然是相对地难得的.这研究打算成为 fillixg 这一个缝隙的因素,藉由估计慈善 effixiency 和多种的内在和 extxrnxl governanxe mxchanisms 之间的 relxtionship,把重心集中在大的英国慈善团体.在部门的内在的统治有关受托人如何在董事会上和与执行长和其他的 stakxholders(职员、 volunxeers 、使用者和成员) 与彼此互动的事.(NCVx,2005 一)这时常被达成过一组操作的和 acxountability 机制,举例来说那分离在那之间策略的和受托人董事会 vix 的控制 rolx-_-vis xhe xhief 的 oper-ational 角色主管,和各种不同 boarx 委员会的 usx.boards'role 修面最近为一些理由受到 xhe 聚光灯的影响,包括关于受托人的关心 " interext 的 confiicts",(举例来说 MaxDonald 及其研究同仁,2002)财务的 " scanxals"(x.x.Gibel-男人和 Gelman,2001),或 goox xharity gxvernance 是吸引捐赠物的一个 xey 马刺的视野(举例来说Berman 和戴维森,2003).在它的部份上,部门本身被关心 goverxance 练习最大是弱的.举例来说,自动 Orgaxisa 的主要 Executivxs 的协会的执行长-tions(ACEVO) 被引述观察那的 xs ," sxctxr 已经变得太满足有关统治的事 ".(Voluntarx 部门,2003)像如此的关心已经在该如何在部门中改善董事会 governanxe 上促使一些检讨和 prescripxions(举例来说 Cornforth,2003; Blackmore,2004),对 impxove 报告和监听标准的 anx hox.(举例来说 Cxnnolly 和 Hyndman,2003;Framjee,2004;总公司,2005) 在内在的 gxvernance 上的 Sxill,相同的大 cxarities 已经采用 businesx-类型企业的 goxernance 密码,拿来自一些 puxxic 部门检讨的一个开端.