麻烦各位高手,帮忙翻译一下Out-of-the-money options: People particularly like the combination of a large potential payoff and limited risk and are willing to pay a premium for it. That is why they buy lottery tickets at prices that embody

麻烦各位高手,帮忙翻译一下Out-of-the-money options: People particularly like the combination of a large potential payoff and limited risk and are willing to pay a premium for it. That is why they buy lottery tickets at prices that embody
麻烦各位高手,帮忙翻译一下
Out-of-the-money options: People particularly like the combination of a large potential payoff and limited risk and are willing to pay a premium for it. That is why they buy lottery tickets at prices that embody an expected loss.
Out-of-the-money options offer a similar payoff pattern. At the same time, the writers of those options are exposed to substanial risk because it is hard to hedge against large price changes. Why should we not expect out-of-the-money options to sell for a premium over fair value?
American options: The possibility of early exercise makes American options hard to value theoretically, especially because the early-exercise provision is seldom exercised optimally according to the theory. This is an enormous problem with mortgage-backed secure ties because of the homeowner's option to prepay the mortgage loan, but all American options share it to some extent. We should not be surprised if the market prices American options differently from their model values because of the uncertainty.
Embedded options: Valuation models treat a security with embedded option features, such as a callable bond or a security with default risk, as if it were simply the sum of a straight security and the option. But the market does not generally price things this way. For example, when coupon strippers unbundle government bonds, or when mortgage pass-throughs are repackaged into CMOs, the sum of the parts sells for more than the original whole. Why should we expect the market to price embedded options as if they could be traded separately when this is not true of other securities?
Times of crisis: The period around the crash of October 1987 showed that in times of financial crisis, arbitrage becomes even harder to do and option prices can be subject to tremendous pressures. At such times, we should not expect to be able to explain market prices well with an arbitrage-based valuation model.

Where Do We Go From Here?
If what is really wanted is a model to explain how the market prices options, it doesn’t make sense for academics and builders of option models to restrict their attention entirely to elaborating arbitrage-based valuation models in an ideal market. They should at least examine broader classes of theories that include factors such as expectations, risk aversion and market "imperfections" that do not enter arbitrage-based valuation models but do affect option demand and supply in the real world.
For those who would use theoretical models to trade actual options, it is safer to use models for hedging than for computing option values; furthermore, the harder the arbitrage is to do, the less confidence these investors can have that the model is going to give either the true option value or the market price. Hedging options with options, rather than with the underlying stock, can provide some defense against inaccurate volatility estimates and model misspecification.

麻烦各位高手,帮忙翻译一下Out-of-the-money options: People particularly like the combination of a large potential payoff and limited risk and are willing to pay a premium for it. That is why they buy lottery tickets at prices that embody
Out-of-the-money options: People particularly like the combination of a large potential payoff and limited risk and are willing to pay a premium for it. That is why they buy lottery tickets at prices that embody an expected loss.
Out-of-the-money options offer a similar payoff pattern. At the same time, the writers of those options are exposed to substanial risk because it is hard to hedge against large price changes. Why should we not expect out-of-the-money options to sell for a premium over fair value?
American options: The possibility of early exercise makes American options hard to value theoretically, especially because the early-exercise provision is seldom exercised optimally according to the theory. This is an enormous problem with mortgage-backed secure ties because of the homeowner's option to prepay the mortgage loan, but all American options share it to some extent. We should not be surprised if the market prices American options differently from their model values because of the uncertainty.
Embedded options: Valuation models treat a security with embedded option features, such as a callable bond or a security with default risk, as if it were simply the sum of a straight security and the option. But the market does not generally price things this way. For example, when coupon strippers unbundle government bonds, or when mortgage pass-throughs are repackaged into CMOs, the sum of the parts sells for more than the original whole. Why should we expect the market to price embedded options as if they could be traded separately when this is not true of other securities?
Times of crisis: The period around the crash of October 1987 showed that in times of financial crisis, arbitrage becomes even harder to do and option prices can be subject to tremendous pressures. At such times, we should not expect to be able to explain market prices well with an arbitrage-based valuation model.
Where Do We Go From Here?
If what is really wanted is a model to explain how the market prices options, it doesn’t make sense for academics and builders of option models to restrict their attention entirely to elaborating arbitrage-based valuation models in an ideal market. They should at least examine broader classes of theories that include factors such as expectations, risk aversion and market "imperfections" that do not enter arbitrage-based valuation models but do affect option demand and supply in the real world.
For those who would use theoretical models to trade actual options, it is safer to use models for hedging than for computing option values; furthermore, the harder the arbitrage is to do, the less confidence these investors can have that the model is going to give either the true option value or the market price. Hedging options with options, rather than with the underlying stock, can provide some defense against inaccurate volatility estimates and model misspecification.
列- - -钱选项：人特别喜欢相结合的一大潜在的收益和有限度的风险,并愿意支付的保费.这就是为什么他们购买彩票的价格,体现了预期的损失.
列- - -钱选项提供了类似的回报模式.在同一时间内,作家,这些选择的暴露风险,因为它是很难对大型对冲价格变动.为什么要我们不能指望出来- - -金钱,选择售价为保费超过公平价值呢?
美式期权：可能性,早期功能锻炼,使美式期权的价值,努力从理论上讲,尤其是因为早期的运动条文是很少行使最佳根据这一理论.这是一个巨大的问题与住房抵押贷款支持的安全关系,因为屋主的选择预付按揭贷款,但所有美式期权的份额,它在一定程度上.我们不应该感到惊讶,如果市场价格美式期权有不同的模式,从他们的价值观,因为不确定性.
嵌入式选项：估价模型,对待安全与嵌入式选项功能,例如作为赎回债券或安全性与违约风险,因为如果它根本的总和直安全和选项.但市场并不普遍价格的东西,这样做.举例来说,当优惠券脱衣舞分拆的政府债券,或当按揭传递throughs重新包装进入CMOS制程,总和部分的售价为更多比原来的整体利益.为什么要我们预期市场价格的嵌入式方案,如果他们可以买卖,分开时,这是不正确的其他证券?
危机时刻：前后坠毁1987年10月表明,在时代的金融危机,成为套利更难做,期权价格会受到巨大的压力.在这种时候,我们不应该期望能解释的市场价格,以及与一套利为基础的计价模式.
何去何从从这里?
如果什么是真的很想是一个模型,解释如何市场价格选项,它是没有道理的学者和建设者的选择模式,以限制他们的注意力完全以拟订套利为基础的估价模型在一个理想的市场.他们至少应研究更广泛的类别的理论,包括因素,如预期,风险规避和市场“不完善” ,不要输入套利为基础的估价模型,但这样做会影响选择供应和需求在现实世界中.
对于谁将会使用的理论模型,以贸易,实际的选择,这是更安全的使用模式,为对冲比计算期权的价值;此外,更难的套戥,就是要做好,少的信心,这些投资者可以有,该模型是去给无论是真正的期权价值或市场价格.对冲选项与选项,而不是与标的股票,可以提供一些防不准确的波动,估计和模型misspecification .