英语翻译4.2.VariablesThe dependent variable is CEO PAY.Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and this is used as a proxy for the pay of the CEO.The CEO's total cash co

英语翻译4.2.VariablesThe dependent variable is CEO PAY.Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and this is used as a proxy for the pay of the CEO.The CEO's total cash co
英语翻译
4.2.Variables
The dependent variable is CEO PAY.Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and this is used as a proxy for the pay of the CEO.The CEO's total cash compensation includesbase salary,bonuses,and commissions (unfortunately the pay is not broken down into these components).Bonus pay is likely to be a function of firm performance,but the formula used and the actual bonus that is paid is not disclosed (bonus pay is aggregated into total pay).The regression models use the natural log of CEO PAY.
The model uses two measures of performance,namely,return on assets (ROA),which is the operating profit divided by assets,and stock return (RETURN).The first measure,ROA,is more dependent on and more under the control of managers,and maximizing profitability is the goal or target that the CEO strives for.The model uses operating profit (also known as“core earnings”) rather than net income as the net income includes gains and losses from asset sales and inter-company transfers (also known as “non-core earnings”); these gains and losses from asset sales and transfers are often outside the control of the CEO and so it is not appropriate to include them in the measure of performance (however,replications of the tests using net income gives similar results and conclusions to those based on operating profit).Problems with the return on assets measure include the encouragement of a short term or myopic outlook at the expense of longer-term profitability and the manipulation of accounting numbers by managers (although operating profit is harder to manipulate than net income).The second measure,stock return,represents the benefits to shareholders.A characteristic of stock returns is that they are harder for managers to manipulate than earnings and they ostensibly measure the longer-term profitability of the firm.One drawback to the use of stock returns is that share prices are subject to the vagaries of the stock market and to changes in the macroenvironment including interest rates,inflation,and commodity prices; these factors are outside the control of the managers.The regressions use lagged performance from year t−1 to explain cash compensation.Thus,CEO PAY is determined by performance in the prior year.As a sensitivity test,the analyses are rerun using contemporaneous performance measures; the results are broadly consistent with those derived from lagged measures of performance.
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英语翻译4.2.VariablesThe dependent variable is CEO PAY.Since 1998 listed firms have been required to disclose the compensation of the highest paid executive in the company and this is used as a proxy for the pay of the CEO.The CEO's total cash co
4.2.可变物
因变量是CEO薪水.因为在公司中要求1998家被列出的企业透露工资最高的执行委员的报偿,并且这使用作为代理人为CEO的薪水.CEO的总现金报偿includesbase薪金、奖金和委员会(不幸地薪水为这些组分没有被划分).奖金薪水可能是牢固的表现的作用,但惯例半新的和是有偿的实际奖金没有被透露(奖金薪水被聚集入总薪水).回归模型使用CEO薪水自然日志.
模型使用二项措施表现,即,财产回收率(ROA),是财产划分的营业利润和股票收益(回归).第一项措施,ROA,更加依赖打开和更多受经理的控制,并且最大化有利是CEO力争的目标或目标.式样用途营业利润(亦称“核心收入”)而不是净收入作为净收入包括获取和损失从财产销售和公司间的调动(亦称“non-core收入”); 这些获取和损失从财产销售和调动经常是在CEO的控制之外和,因此它是不适当的包括他们在表现措施(然而,测试的复制使用净收入给近似结果和结论根据营业利润的那些).问题以财产回收率措施牺牲较长期有利包括一个短期或近视外型和帐号的操作的鼓励由经理(虽然营业利润比净收入是坚硬操作).第二项措施,股票收益,代表好处对股东.股票收益的特征是他们比收入是坚硬为了经理能操作,并且他们外表测量企业的较长期有利.一个缺点到对股票收益的用途是股票行市是受股市的狂妄古怪的行为支配和对在大环境上的变化包括利率、通货膨胀和商品价格; 这些因素是在经理的控制之外.退化用途滞后了表现从解释现金报偿的年t−1.因此,CEO薪水在去年取决于表现.作为敏感性试验,分析使用并世工作指标被重新开动; 结果与从表现滞后的措施获得的那些宽广地是一致的.