哪位英语大神可以帮翻译一下这点文章啊,谷歌有道之类翻译不准,请人工翻译,通顺一点.谢谢.比较急I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy. I iden
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哪位英语大神可以帮翻译一下这点文章啊,谷歌有道之类翻译不准,请人工翻译,通顺一点.谢谢.比较急I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy. I iden
哪位英语大神可以帮翻译一下这点文章啊,谷歌有道之类翻译不准,请人工翻译,通顺一点.谢谢.比较急
I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy. I identified the Government and the taxi lobby as the main determinants of policy. I also gave each player a choice between two different alternative actions. For the Government, the choice is between the types of policy they opt to follow. The first choice is called ‘open policy’ where the Government allows the open issuing of new taxi licenses. The second option is called ‘closed policy’ where the Government refuses to issue licenses or issues a small ineffectual amount of licenses. The
taxi drivers also have two choices; they can opt to ‘protest’ or ‘not protest’ where protest means to engage in strikes, blockades, strenuous lobbying, and so on—in effect, anything that can impose a negative cost on the policymaker. As I moved through the periods following, I attached various values to the different positions in order to illustrate the effect of changes in policy.
PERIOD 1: 1978–1991 The first period under consideration is a relatively long phase of 13 years and lasts from 1978 until 1991. The period begins with the taxi drivers successfully persuading the then Minister for the Environment, Mr. Sylvester Barrett TD (Fianna Fáil), to suspend the issuing of taxi licenses in 1978 after they had blockaded the Butt Bridge for a week. The Irish Times on 28 August 1978 stated, ‘The strike is the culmination of a long battle by the Irish Taxi Federation for strict limits on the numbers of license plates issued’ (Boland, 1978: p. 1).
The moratorium attracted little attention during the recessionary decade of the 1980s. However, as the decade drew to a close and the first ‘green
shoots’ of economic recovery began to appear, the limit on the number of taxis within Dublin citybegan to have an effect on the quality of the taxi service. Long queues at taxi ranks began to form at night, and it became increasingly difficult to get a taxi at other busy times especially Friday afternoons (O’Connor, 1992: p. 13). The emergence of queues, the economic growth, and the commissioning of a report signaled the end of this period and the movement to Period 2.
Taxis
The taxi drivers as mentioned above obtained in 1978 a favorable ‘closed’ regulatory environment through strikes, lobbying, and court action. This closure of the policy environment is of value to the taxi drivers as it gives them monopoly power. I assigned an arbitrary illustrative value of €10 thatthe closed policy is worth to the taxi drivers (see Figure 1). An ‘open’ regulatory environment is worth €0 to the taxi drivers. As they have demonstrated to the Government, the taxi lobby is willing to ‘protest’ in order to achieve their desired outcome. The cost of ‘protest’ for the taxi drivers is €1, whereas it costs €0 for them to ‘not protest’.
没想到这么少,有思路了,麻烦再帮翻译下这些,字越多越好。谢谢了。If the Government chooses an ‘open policy’, it
receives little or no ‘democratic boost’ from the
electorate. This is because on a national level, taxi
policymaking is far down the list of priorities for
ordinary voters especially for those voterswho are not
directly affected. Further, during this early period,
there was very little general awareness of the issue
in the public domain. If the Government chooses
‘closed policy’, it receives a benefit of€2 fromthe taxi
drivers in the form of electoral contributions,
favorable comment from the taxi lobby, help ferrying
elderly voters to the polls at election time, and so on..
哪位英语大神可以帮翻译一下这点文章啊,谷歌有道之类翻译不准,请人工翻译,通顺一点.谢谢.比较急I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy. I iden
I used a simple game theoretic format to illustrate the interaction between the main players in deciding policy.I identified the Government and the taxi lobby as the main determinants of policy.I also gave each player a choice between two different alternative actions.For the Government,the choice is between the types of policy they opt to follow.The first choice is called ‘open policy’ where the Government allows the open issuing of new taxi licenses.The second option is called ‘closed policy’ where the Government refuses to issue licenses or issues a small ineffectual amount of licenses.The taxi drivers also have two choices; they can opt to ‘protest’ or ‘not protest’ where protest means to engage in strikes,blockades,strenuous lobbying,and so on—in effect,anything that can impose a negative cost on the policymaker.As I moved through the periods following,I attached various values to the different positions in order to illustrate the effect of changes in policy.
我使用一种简单的游戏理论格式来演示决定政策的重要主角之间的互动.我确定政府及出租车游说团体是决定政策的主要因素;而我也给每个主角在两个不同的行动中选择其一.对政府而言,有两种政策可供选择:第一种是“开放政策”;就是允许发放新的出租车执照.第二种是“封闭政策”;也就是政府拒绝发放执照,或限制性地发放小量的执照.出租车司机也有两个选择:他们可以选择“抗议”或“不抗议”;抗议是指罢驶、堵塞交通、竭尽全力游说等等,就是任何能够使决策者蒙受损失的行动.随着我穿越接下来的时间段,我给不同的时间段附上各种值,以便体现政策改变的效果.
PERIOD 1:1978–1991 The first period under consideration is a relatively long phase of 13 years and lasts from 1978 until 1991.The period begins with the taxi drivers successfully persuading the then Minister for the Environment,Mr.Sylvester Barrett TD (Fianna Fáil),to suspend the issuing of taxi licenses in 1978 after they had blockaded the Butt Bridge for a week.The Irish Times on 28 August 1978 stated,‘The strike is the culmination of a long battle by the Irish Taxi Federation for strict limits on the numbers of license plates issued’ (Boland,1978:p.1).
时间段1:1978 – 1991
这是从1978年至1991年相对较长的13年阶段.这段时期由出租车司机于1978年堵塞巴特桥一周后,成功说服时任环境部长的Sylvester Barrett禁止发放出租车执照开始.1978年8月28号的爱尔兰时报报导:“这是爱尔兰出租车联合会要求限制发放执照的漫长斗争中,达到最高峰时所采取的罢驶行动.”(Boland,1978年文献:第1页)
The moratorium attracted little attention during the recessionary decade of the 1980s.However,as the decade drew to a close and the first ‘green shoots’ of economic recovery began to appear,the limit on the number of taxis within Dublin city began to have an effect on the quality of the taxi service.Long queues at taxi ranks began to form at night,and it became increasingly difficult to get a taxi at other busy times especially Friday afternoons (O’Connor,1992:p.13).The emergence of queues,the economic growth,and the commissioning of a report signaled the end of this period and the movement to Period 2.
当时正值经济衰退的八十年代,这个禁令没有引起太多的关注.但是,随着八十年代的结束,以及经济复苏的开始萌芽,在都柏林市受限制的出租车数量开始影响出租车服务的质量.晚上在出租车站排长龙的现象开始出现,在其他繁忙时间,特别是星期五下午,搭出租车是越来越困难了(O’Connor,1992年文献:第13页).排队等候、经济增长及启动一份政府报告等等的出现,预示这段时期的结束,并进入第二个阶段.
Taxis
The taxi drivers as mentioned above obtained in 1978 a favorable ‘closed’ regulatory environment through strikes,lobbying,and court action.This closure of the policy environment is of value to the taxi drivers as it gives them monopoly power.I assigned an arbitrary illustrative value of €10 that the closed policy is worth to the taxi drivers (see Figure 1).An ‘open’ regulatory environment is worth €0 to the taxi drivers.As they have demonstrated to the Government,the taxi lobby is willing to ‘protest’ in order to achieve their desired outcome.The cost of ‘protest’ for the taxi drivers is €1,whereas it costs €0 for them to ‘not protest’.
出租车
上述的出租车司机通过罢驶、游说及诉讼,于1978年获得有利的“封闭”监管环境.这种政策环境使出租车司机拥有垄断势力,对他们是有价值的.我指定一个10欧元的任意展示值,作为这封闭政策对出租车司机的价值(参阅图1).“开放”的监管环境对出租车司机而言,其价值是0欧元.出租车团体已向政府表示,他们愿意以“抗议”来达到目的.出租车司机的“抗议”成本是1欧元,而“不抗议”的成本则是0欧元.
【英语牛人团】
专业翻译:QQ438131413