英语翻译We extend our analyses by examining the importance of accounting fundamentals when firms report losses or decreases in earnings.We conduct this analysis because,as discussed above,prior research indicates that losses and decreases in earn

英语翻译We extend our analyses by examining the importance of accounting fundamentals when firms report losses or decreases in earnings.We conduct this analysis because,as discussed above,prior research indicates that losses and decreases in earn
英语翻译
We extend our analyses by examining the importance of accounting fundamentals when firms report losses or decreases in earnings.We conduct this analysis because,as discussed above,prior research indicates that losses and decreases in earnings are,at best,only weakly related to CEO bonus compensation.If bonus compensation is treated as an executive entitlement rather than as a reward for good firm performance,we should find a similarly weak relationship between accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation when firms report losses or decreases in earnings.We find that accounting fundamentals consistently explain the level of and change in CEO bonus compensation when earnings are negative or declining.On the other hand,consistent with the prior literature,we find that earnings are generally unrelated to CEO bonus compensation when firms report negative earnings or decreases in earnings.Thus,our evidence suggests that when earnings are negative or declining,compensation committees significantly rely on other measures of performance in setting CEO bonus compensation.This finding helps to explain,in part,why CEO’s receive bonus compensation (increases in bonus compensation) when their firms report losses (decreases in earnings).

英语翻译We extend our analyses by examining the importance of accounting fundamentals when firms report losses or decreases in earnings.We conduct this analysis because,as discussed above,prior research indicates that losses and decreases in earn
我们把我们的分析的重要性,通过对会计基础当厂商报告损失或减少对收入.我们进行分析,因为如上所述,先前的研究表明,收入和减少损失,没有多少关联最多也只有向CEO奖金补偿.如果奖金补偿被视为一项行政权利,而不是作为奖励,公司业绩良好,我们应该找到一个同样的弱关系基本奖金和首席执行官会计予补偿损失或减少对公司的报告的收入.我们发现会计基础的水平一直解释首席执行官和改变奖金补偿收入都是负面的或下降.另一方面,符合事先文献的时候,我们发现收益一般不相关的向CEO奖金补偿当公司报告负面的收入或减少对收入.因此,我们有证据表明,收入是负面的或下降,明显依赖其它薪酬委员会设置的运作措施首席执行官奖金补偿.这一发现有助于解释,部分,为什么首席执行官的收到奖金补偿(增加奖金补偿),当他们的公司的报告盈利损失(减少).