收集中国政府对待金融危机的措施!要英文的哦

收集中国政府对待金融危机的措施!要英文的哦
收集中国政府对待金融危机的措施!要英文的哦

收集中国政府对待金融危机的措施!要英文的哦
On 27 September 2008, Premier Wen claimed in the World Economic Forum in Tianjin that "the biggest contribution we can make to the world economy under the current circumstances is to maintain China's strong, stable and relatively fast growth, and avoid big fluctuations." In our view, during this worst credit crunch in decades, China could and might make contributions in another two fronts:
-- Mirroring China’s promise not to devalue RMB in 1998, China will likely to promise （implicitly） not to dump USD-denominated financial assets by its central bank, which holds about US$1.0tn in US Treasuries and agency bonds （see Fannie, Freddie, and China’s SAFE; 25 July 2008）.
-- Learning from the lessons of the US property and financial sectors, China will excise enough due diligence to avoid a real estate-related financial crisis on its own land. Actually, on 29 September 2008 when Premier Wen was interviewed by CNN, he said global leaders should cooperate to deal with the current global crisis.
A sweeping change of policy stance in the making
We will likely see a sea change of mentality among top policy makers in Beijing soon. Policies will be geared up to stimulate economy while minimizing those financial and economic impacts of an imminent real estate bust. With a good harvest and falling prices of almost all major commodities, inflation is not a big worry for the moment.
-- On the fiscal side, we expect （1） Tax cuts, especially the US$150bn VAT cut （by allowing deduction of capital goods） which will almost surely be passed and enacted from the beginning of next year; （2） Fiscal spending plan with an emphasis on infrastructure and economy housing; （3） Accelerating the post-earthquake reconstruction plan which has a budget of RMB1.0tn over a three-year horizon. Beijing may learn from the experience in 1998 by issuing long-term special bonds to bolster this fiscal spending on construction.
-- On the monetary side, the government will continue to be cautious in loosening credit to the property sector, but we expect regulators to ease some controls, especially those on second mortgage. For the manufacturing sector, credit will likely be noticeably eased. Reserve requirement ratio could be cut if trade surplus contracts in future months as export growth slows down. Interest rates will likely be reduced further to reduce costs of the corporate sector and to shore up the property sector.
-- On the regulation side, financial regulation will be strengthened to ensure the health of the financial sector. Having observed the devastating effects of the subprime crisis, leaders in Beijing could excise extra caution in developing its capital markets. The traditional banking sector will be closely monitored to control NPLs as a result of falling property prices. If falling housing pose a real danger to the health of banking sector, the government will undoubtedly step in to intervene.
Actions on the international front
A decade ago China was applauded by not devaluing its currency. This time around, China's central bank will surely be appreciated by not selling off US Treasuries and agency bonds. In an effort to show the willingness to cooperate with other major economies, China will likely maintain its holdings of US Treasuries and agency bonds and may even add US Treasuries.
On currency, China is unlikely to devalue RMB on a trade weighted basis despite a fall in export growth. However, in support of the export sector, China may not allow its currency to appreciate rapidly, especially against USD. A stable RMB versus USD （to a lesser extent, on a trade-weighted basis） is what we expect.
Can Premier Wen deliver?
Most likely, yes. Given the 11.9% growth in 2007 and 10.4% in 1H08, a "stable" growth perhaps means a growth pace above 9.0%, at least not below 8.0%. In the market, pessimism is understandably rampant as the Chinese economy is squeezed by the weakness of the global economy and an imminent bust of a real estate bubble, but we think some pessimism is overdone. You may refer to our earlier reports for our views on growth （See China--The case for boredom, 12 September 2008）; here we just summarize our views:
-- We believe China is able to achieve GDP growth above 9% for three reasons:
（1） the real estate cycle now replaces exports as the biggest drag on China's growth, but real estate is domestic demand; （2） About 90% of China’s GDP is domestic demand; （3） Overall fiscal status is in a good shape, public debt is only about 20% of annual GDP. We believe the government has the capacity to shore up growth in the short term by easing policies and by initiating programs for fiscal spending.
-- We should avoid extrapolating the future from 3Q08 data, which is especially hit by the Olympics. Never underestimate China's determination to clean Beijing's air during the Olympics in August and September. We expect growth in 3Q08 to drop to around 9.0% from 10.1% in 2Q08.
-- We expect a rebound of growth in 4Q08, though we admit that there is downside risk in this extremely uncertain world. Investment needs to stabilize, and policy needs to respond rapidly if the outlook worsens or growth fails to rebound in 4Q08. The next 3-5 months of data are critical to determining the direction of the Chinese economy.